The High Court has dismissed a claim brought by a commuter Matthew Robinson against Abellio Greater Anglia Limited, (the train operating company for the West Anglia line) [2018] EWHC 272 (QB). On 13 January 2013 the Claimant had alighted from a train and fell between the platform edge and the train as the train was leaving the station at Bishops Stortford.

The train was a Driver Only Operation-Passenger train. As Mr Robinson left the train and walked towards the ticket barriers he could not find his wallet containing his season ticket (which costs in excess of £3000). He became stressed and agitated and hurried back to the train to look for his wallet. He mistakenly entered the wrong carriage and on hearing the trains hustle alarm he realised that the doors were about to close and so he left the carriage and walked back towards the ticket barriers. Before reaching the barriers he turned around again and jogged back down the platform. The train started to move off and Mr Robinson began moving along side the moving train looking through the windows to see if he could spot his wallet. His right foot then slipped on the edge of the platform and he fell through the gap between the train and the platform edge suffering serious injury. The driver of the train was unaware of the accident and continued to pull away from the station.

The Network Rail rule book states that when starting a driver only train the driver must check the whole length of the train to make sure that it is safe to close the doors by using the CCTV or mirror if there is one. After the doors are closed the driver must then check that the door interlock light is lit. The driver must then carry out the train safety check of the whole length of the train by using CCTV or mirror if there is one. The driver therefor has to carry out three checks – (i) check to make sure it is safe to close the door; (ii) check that the door interlock light is lit; and (iii) carry out a train safety check before applying power and after the interlock light is lit. In June 2011 the Rail Safety Standards Board had also introduced the concept of a “Dispatch Corridor” to check that nothing or nobody was potentially trapped on the outside of the train that might be dragged along the platform when the train departs.

Mr Robinson’s case was that the Defendant failed in its duty to devise suitable and sufficient control measures to reduce the risk of an accident or injury to the lowest level. Control measures should have been implemented which could have included platform staff in the role of the dispatch process. Had control measures been in place then Mr Robinson’s behaviour could have been observed, some sort of warning given and acted upon and the accident on balance could have been avoided.

After hearing evidence, the Judge did not find the defendants negligent. There was no history of poor platform safety and the station did not have particularly high passenger numbers and had not had any previous Platform Train Interface incident. The defendant’s method statement and its train dispatch risk assessment were appropriate. The Process complied with rail industry standards.

Mr Robinson failed to establish any breach of duty and also failed to establish causation (in relation to breaches of duty alleged by him). He would have heard “mind the gap” announcements on numerous occasions and was aware of the gap between the train and the platform edge. He was stressed and agitated and anxious to recover his season ticket and chose to place himself in a position of danger. He suffered serious injuries, but the defendant rail company were not liable for the accident.