The Supreme Court judgment in the case of Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4 takes us on a tour through the history and principles of the tort of negligence. The Judgment is well worth a read for a review and consideration of the general principles applicable to a negligence claim. This is a case which will be of particular interest to lawyers and law students.

On a Tuesday afternoon in July 2008 Mrs Robinson, a relatively frail lady then aged 76 was walking along a shopping street in Huddersfield when she was knocked over by a group of men who were struggling with each other. Two of the men were police officers and third was a suspected drug dealer whom they were attempting to arrest. As they struggled, the men knocked into Mrs Robinson and they all fell to the ground and Mrs Robinson suffered injuries. The principal question which had to be decided by the Court was whether the officers owed a duty of care to Mrs Robinson and if they did, were they in breach of that duty. At trial the Recorder held that the officers had been negligent, but that police officers engaged in the apprehension of criminals in this case were immune from suit and had an immunity against claims in negligence. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that no duty of care was owed.

Mrs Robinson appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court embarked upon the exercise of applying long established principles of the law of negligence to the facts of the case. These principles had been eroded in recent times by uncertainty and confusion.

The issues in the case were summarised as:-

1. Does the existence of a duty of care always depend on the application of the “Caparo test” (as set out in the case of Caparo Industries PLC v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605);
2. Is there a general rule that the police are not under any duty of care when discharging their function of investigating and preventing crime? Or are the police generally under a duty of care to avoid causing reasonably foreseeable personal injuries, when such a duty would arise in accordance with ordinary principles of the law of negligence? If the latter is the position, does the law distinguish between acts and omissions: in particular, between causing injury, and protecting individuals from injury caused by the conduct of others?
3. If the latter is the position, is this an omissions case, or a case of a positive act?
4. Did the police officers owe a duty of care to Mrs Robinson?
5. If so was the Court of Appeal entitled to overturn the Recorder’s finding that the officers failed in that duty?
6. If there was a breach of a duty of care owed to Mrs Robinson, were her injuries caused by that breach?

The first issue was considered in detail by the Supreme Court with a review of the authorities and case law. The first thing they noted was that the proposition that there is a “Caparo test” which applies to all claims in the modern law of negligence, and that in consequence the court will only impose a duty of care where it considers it fair, just and reasonable to do so on the particular facts, is mistaken. It is normally only in a novel type of case where established principles do not provide an answer that the court needs to go beyond those principles in order to decide whether a duty of care should be recognised. The existence of a duty of care in Mrs Robinson’s case does not depend on the application of a “Caparo test”, but it will depend on the application of established principles of the law of negligence.

The general law of tort applies as much to the police as to anyone else. A police officer may be liable in tort to a person who is injured as a direct result of his acts. There is no general immunity which would apply to the police when carrying out their duties. Policy considerations, for example whether the police should have immunity from suit as a matter of public policy so that they can carry out their duties without fear of being sued, may be relevant but are not automatically applicable where existing principles provide a clear basis in law for reaching a decision.

The police officers did owe Mrs Robinson a duty of care. Her injuries were caused as a result of a positive act by the police officers, rather than an omission. Their actions resulted in her being injured (positive act) and the injuries were not caused by the police officers failing to protect her against the risk of being injured (omission).

The Recorder was entitled to reach his decision that the officers had failed in their duty of care. The Supreme Court found that the police were liable to Mrs Robinson. It would be wrong to say that the officers owed Mrs Robinson a duty of care not to arrest the suspect when she was in the immediate vicinity, because of the danger that she might be injured if he attempted to escape. If he did then attempt to escape, this would not break the chain of causation.

Mrs Robinson was entitled to compensation for her injuries. This is a judgment which is relevant to the individual facts that gave rise to the incident. The judgment of Lord Reed provides more detail about the individual facts about the case and the application of the law and principles of negligence and development in relation to public authorities. There is a link to the judgment so that it can be read in more detail.